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JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS IN COMMERCIAL
LITIGATION-THE SINGLE CONTRACT CASE
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462 (1985)
INTRODUCTION
The transaction of business on a daily basis is becoming more
and more of an interstate activity. Multistate litigation is becom-
ing increasingly common, and courts are called on more and more
frequently to assert jurisdiction over non-residents. Yet courts have
had difficulty determining which types of commercial contacts
between a defendant and a forum state satisfy the constitutional
standards of due process.'
The modem requirement for in personam jurisdiction was set
forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.' A state cannot
assert in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant un-
less it establishes that the nonresident has "minimum contacts"
with the state such that maintenance of the suit would not "offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "' In In-
ternational Shoe the Court held that a state could assert jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident if he had "continuous and systematic"'
dealings with the state which gave rise to the cause of action, but
it could not assert jurisdiction if the contacts were isolated and
the cause of action was unrelated to those contacts.5
The issue of whether isolated contacts can ever serve as the
basis for jurisdiction was decided by the Court in McGee v. In-
ternational Life Insurance Co.6 The Court attempted to refine its
jurisdictional test a year later in Hanson v. Denckla. 7 While McGee
and Hanson serve as the major guidelines in determining whether
1. See Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907, 909 (1980) (White,
J., joined by Powell, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
4. Id. at 317.
5. Id.
6. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
7. 357 U.S. 235, reh'g denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958).
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to assert jurisdiction in commercial litigation, they have been in-
terpreted inconsistently by lower courts since they were handed
down.8 The Court tried to clarify the principles established by
these cases in several more recent decisions, 9 but inconsistent anal-
ysis is still found among the lower courts.'"
The Court in its decision in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz"
sought to lend more guidance to the lower courts in determining
jurisdictional issues in single contract cases. 12 It set out factors
which should be examined to determine if this single contact is
sufficient to give the nonresident warning that he is amenable to
suit in that jurisdiction.
FACTS
In the fall of 1978, John Rudzewicz and Brian MacShara, both
Michigan residents, decided to purchase a Burger King restaur-
ant franchise in a Detroit, Michigan, suburb. They contacted Burg-
er King's district office in Michigan and jointly applied for a
franchise. Their application was forwarded to Burger King's Mi-
ami headquarters for approval." At the time they applied for the
franchise, Rudzewicz and MacShara were given a copy of Burg-
er King's franchise offering circular, which states in part that "[tihe
business activities of Burger King Corporation are conducted by
the officers and directors of the corporation, all of whom may
be contacted [in the Florida office]."'"
Neither Rudzewicz nor MacShara went to the Florida office
to negotiate the contract. Instead they negotiated with the Michi-
gan district manager for five months before a preliminary agree-
ment was approved in February, 1979.'" During that five-month
8. Compare Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Elecs. Corp., 417 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1969) with Iowa Elec.
Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980).
9. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980); Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 908 (1978); Shaffer v. Heimer,
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
10. See Brewer, Jurisdiction in Single Contract Cases, 6 U. AtK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1 (1983); Note, Long-
Arm Jurisdiction in Commercial Litigation: When Is a Contract a Contact?, 61 B.U.L. REv. 375 (1981).
11. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
12. The single contract case arises from the breach of a contract between residents of different states. Neither
party has any contact with the other, or with the other's home state, except this one contract.
13. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 466. Burger King is a Florida corporation with its principal place of
business in Miami. Id. at 464. It has 10 district offices which report to the Miami headquarters. Id. at 466.
14. Record at 11 App.
15. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 466. At the end of each stage of negotiations, the Miami office mailed
the franchisees documents for their signatures, which they signed and returned to the Miami office for comple-
tion. The headquarters then mailed copies of the executed documents to the franchisees for their files. Burger
King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1507 (11th Cir. 1984).
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period, MacShara went to Miami to attend the required manage-
ment training course, and the franchisees purchased restaurant
equipment from Burger King's Davmore Industries division in Mi-
ami for $165,000.16
Before the final agreements were signed, the parties began to
disagree over the contract terms such as site-development fees
and monthly rent computations. During these disputes, Rudzewicz
and MacShara negotiated with the Michigan office as well as the
Miami office, and finally they secured limited concessions. 7
The final contract was signed in June, 1979 and provided that
Rudzewicz and MacShara would lease the Burger King facility
for twenty years and remit all rent and other fees to the Miami
headquarters.1" The documents also contained provisions which
stated that the agreement was "deemed made and entered into in
the State of Florida and shall be governed and construed under
and in accordance with the laws of the State of Florida." 9 By sign-
ing the final agreements, Rudzewicz obligated himself personal-
ly to payments exceeding $1,000,000 over the twenty-year term
of the franchise."°
The facility operated by Rudzewicz and MacShara did not en-
joy great success, and they were soon delinquent in remitting rent
payments to Burger King in Miami. Officials in Miami entered
into extended but unsuccessful negotiations with the franchisees
by mail and by telephone and eventually terminated the franchise
and ordered Rudzewicz and MacShara to vacate the premises.
They refused and continued to operate the facility as a Burger
King restaurant.2
Burger King filed suit for trademark infringement and breach
of contract in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. Rudzewicz and MacShara appeared specially
to challenge the court's jurisdiction, but the district court denied
16. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 466-67.
17. Id. at 467. The franchisees discovered the district office was powerless to resolve their disputes and
could only channel their communications to the Miami office, and they therefore dealt directly with the head-
quarters in negotiating the contract. Rudzewicz and MacShara obtained a $10,439 rent reduction for their ef-
forts. Id. at 467 nn.7-8. The dissent disagreed with these facts. The court of appeals and the dissent maintained
that the Michigan manager evaluated the initial application and notified the franchisees on behalf of the corpo-
ration of its approval and that the defendant was in contact only with the Michigan office during the negotia-
tions. Id. at 488-89.
18. Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d at 1507.
19. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 481 (quoting the record).
20. Id. at 467.
21. Id. at 468.
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their motion and ruled in favor of Burger King on the merits.22
Rudzewicz appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit.23 A divided panel of that court reversed the
district court's judgment, concluding that to assert jurisdiction un-
der the facts of this case "would offend the fundamental fairness
which is the touchstone of due process."2" The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, holding that the district court's exercise of jurisdiction pur-
suant to Florida's long-arm statute did not violate the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.2"
BACKGROUND
The due process standard for asserting in personam jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant was set out by the United States
Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington."6 The
International Shoe test allows a state court to exercise jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident who is served with process outside of the
state boundaries if that person has established "certain minimum
contacts" with the state.2 7 The test, as the Court stated, is not "sim-
ply mechanical or quantitative."2 It requires a detailed analysis
of the facts in each case in order to decide the jurisdictional ques-
tion. 29 To determine if a nonresident has met the minimum con-
22. Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d at 1508. The district court exercised jurisdiction pursuant
to Florida's long-arm statute, FLA. STAT. § 48.193(l)(g) (Supp. 1984), which provides:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent
does any of the acts enumerated in this sub section thereby submits that person and, if he is a natural
person, his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action
arising from the doing of any of the following acts:
(g) Breaches a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be per-
formed in this state.
23. MacShara did not appeal his judgment. In addition, Rudzewicz reached a compromise with Burger King
and waived his right to appeal the court's decision regarding the trademark infringement. Burger King Corp.,
471 U.S. at 469-70 & n.ll.
24. Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d at 1513.
25. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 487.
26. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The Court held:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be
not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'
Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. at 457, 463 (1940)).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 319.
29. "Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in rela-
tion to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to
insure." Id.
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tacts test, the court must examine the "relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation.""
Applying the minimum contacts test to the facts in Internation-
al Shoe, the Supreme Court concluded that the Washington court
could assert jurisdiction. Activities carried on by International Shoe
in the state were "neither irregular nor casual" but were "systematic
and continuous," and those activities gave rise to the obligation
sued on.3"
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. ,32 the Court ap-
plied the principles set out in International Shoe to a situation
which the Court in International Shoe left undecided. The McGee
Court examined the question of when isolated contacts with a fo-
rum state are sufficient to allow the state to assert jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant.33 In upholding the assertion of jurisdic-
tion by California over a nonresident insurance company which
had only one policy in force within the state, the Court, while
not actually expanding the doctrines of International Shoe, em-
phasized factors other than the defendant's conduct within the fo-
rum and stressed the "fairness aspect" of International Shoe's
minimum contacts test. 4 The decision firmly established that the
30. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
31. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). International Shoe Company was
a Delaware corporation. The firm had no office in Washington and its only employees within the state were
salesmen who solicited orders for the company. The salesmen had no authority to enter into contracts, all ord-
ers had to be approved by the home office, and all orders were shipped from points outside Washington. The
state of Washington was seeking to collect unemployment taxes based on commissions paid by the company
to its Washington salesmen. Id. at 312-14. The test was easy to apply to these facts because the contacts were
substantial and continuous, and the cause of action was directly related to those contacts. But the decision gave
little guidance in situations where either the contacts were isolated but gave rise to a related cause of action
or the contacts were continuous and systematic but the cause of action was unrelated to those contacts. The
guidelines in these areas have continued to develop over the past forty years. See Murchison, Jurisdiction Over
Persons, Things and Status, 41 LA. L. REv. 1053, 1090-91 (1981) (gray areas remained in two classes of cases).
32. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
33. International, a Texas insurance company, assumed the insurance obligations of Empire Mutual Insur-
ance Company of Arizona in 1948. International mailed a reinsurance certificate to Lowell Franklin, one of
Empire's policyholders in California, offering to continue his insurance coverage. Franklin accepted the offer,
and from 1948 until his death in 1950, Franklin mailed the premiums from his California home to Internation-
al's Texas office. The suit was an action on that policy, which apparently was the only policy International
had issued in California. Id. at 221-22.
34. The Court determined that jurisdiction was proper because it was "based on a contract which had sub-
stantial connection" with the forum. Id. at 223. In finding the connection to be substantial, the Court considered
several relevant factors: the defendant solicited the contract with a California resident, the California resident
accepted the contract and mailed premiums from his home, the defendant would effectively be judgment proof
if California plaintiffs were forced to litigate small claims in distant forums, and the state had an interest in
providing its citizens with a means of redress. Id.
1986]
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physical presence of a defendant within the forum is not neces-
sary for the assertion of jurisdiction to be proper" and that con-
tact by mail can be sufficient.36
The cases decided by the Supreme Court from International
Shoe through McGee greatly expanded the scope of personal juris-
diction. However, when the Court rendered its opinion in Han-
son v. Denckla" denying Florida jurisdiction over a Delaware
trustee, it was apparent that the Court did not intend to eliminate
all restrictions on the state courts' assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion over nonresidents.3" One distinction the Court seemed to draw
between the situation in Hanson and that in McGee was that,
although the contacts in Hanson were quantitatively as great as
in McGee, the contacts in McGee were initiated by the defendant
and in Hanson they were not.39 This distinction led to a clarifica-
tion of the International Shoe test by requiring that the defendant
must, by some act, "purposefully [avail] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws."40
Hanson, with its reliance on the defendant's contacts with the
forum and its "purposeful availment" test, did not eliminate the
problems the courts had when applying the minimum contacts test
to determine if jurisdiction was proper in a given case. The state
courts continued to interpret liberally the fairness aspect of the
minimum contacts test in favor of asserting jurisdiction. They were
likely to find the state's interest in the litigation to be paramount
35. Id. at 222, 224. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (sale of newspapers within forum); Keeton
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (sale of magazines within forum); Travelers Health Ass'n
v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (solicitation of insurance contracts through the mail).
36. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. at 223; Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S.
643 (1950).
37. 357 U.S. 235, reh'g denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958). Mrs. Dora Donner, while a Pennsylvania resident,
executed a trust instrument in Delaware, naming a Delaware bank as trustee. Mrs. Donner subsequently moved
to Florida. From Florida she corresponded with the Delaware trustee about the administration of the trust,
and the trustee remitted the trust income to her in Florida. Mrs. Donner executed a power of appointment
over the remainder of the trust in Florida. The controversy arose over the validity of that appointment. Id.
at 238-39, 252.
38. But Hanson did not in fact slow the expansion of personal jurisdiction. See Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Su-
perior Court of Los Angeles County, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Gray v. Ameri-
can Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 nl. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Bryant v. Finnish Natl Airline,
15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965). This may be true because the Hanson decision
can be interpreted as doing justice under the particular facts of the case. The effect of the Florida decision
invalidating the appointment was to augment the $1,000,000 gift to two daughters at the expense of two grand-
children. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 240. See J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 84 (3d ed. 1980).
39. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 252. In declining to uphold jurisdiction, the Court stated that "[tihe
unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the require-
ment of contact with the forum State." Id. at 253.
40. Id.
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to the burden placed on the defendant.' Twenty years after Han-
son, the Supreme Court decided several jurisdictional cases in
an attempt to offer more direction to the lower courts.
In 1977 in Shaffer v. Heitner,4 ' the Court expanded the mini-
mum contacts test to all cases, holding that the presence of property
within the state will not automatically give that state the right to
exercise jurisdiction over the person. Other minimum contacts
must be found. 3 The Court in Shaffer" reemphasized the impor-
tance of the defendant's contacts with the forum. The defendant
must have purposefully entered the forum state at some time or
have directly invoked the benefit or protection of that state's laws
in some way before the state can properly exercise jurisdiction.45
The importance of the defendant's purposeful contact with the
forum was again emphasized by the Court in 1980 in its decision
in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson."6 Before a forum
state can constitutionally assert jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, that individual must have reason to believe that his con-
duct has in some way rendered him liable to suit within that state. 7
41. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d
57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I11. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
42. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
43. Id. at 212-13. The Court prior to 1977 had established that a person did not have to be physically present
within the forum state for that state to assert in personarn jurisdiction if it could be established that the nonresi-
dent had sufficient contact with the state to justify the assertion of jurisdiction. McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). However, it was still the Court's policy to allow the assertion of
jurisdiction over a nonresident based on the attachment of property located within the forum, regardless of
the lack of other deliberate contacts.
44. In Shaffer, the plaintiff brought a shareholder's derivative action against a Delaware corporation's non-
resident directors and officers. The Delaware court asserted jurisdiction pursuant to a Delaware statute provid-
ing for attachment of any stock in a Delaware corporation to provide quasi in rem jurisdiction over its owner.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 189-91, 194.
45. Id. at 213-16. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its position the following year in Kulko v. Superior Court
of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 908 (1978). In Kulko, the parties were New York residents,
but the mother later moved to California. The daughter remained in New York with her father but later decided
she wanted to live in California with her mother. The father consented and bought her an airline ticket to Califor-
nia. The mother then brought suit in California against the father for increased child support. The Court held
that California's assertion of jurisdiction violated due process because the nonresident defendant did not pur-
posefully avail himself of the benefits and protections of California's laws. Id. at 86-88, 94, 96. While the
contacts with the state seem sufficient to allow jurisdiction on a related cause of action, the Court in its reason-
ing makes a distinction between an act for commercial benefit and one which is strictly personal. Id. at 95, 97.
46. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In World-Wide, the action was brought in Oklahoma against the New York distri-
butor and the New York retailer of a car bought in New York and involved in an accident in Oklahoma. Neither
defendant sold cars in Oklahoma nor did any business there. The Oklahoma court asserted jurisdiction on the
grounds that it was foreseeable that the automobile would travel to Oklahoma and the defendants derived a
benefit from their products being used there. The United States Supreme Court reversed that determination
and emphasized that the defendant had done nothing to avail itself of the benefits of Oklahoma law. Id. at
288-90, 295.
47. Id. at 296-97.
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The Court explained:
[The foreseability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product
will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with
the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.
48
International Shoe and its progeny established the general prin-
ciples to be used by the courts in jurisdictional analysis. The defen-
dant must perform some affirmative act which causes
consequences in the forum, and that act must be purposefully or
foreseeably connected with the forum state in such a way as to
invoke the benefits and protections of the state's laws and give
the defendant reason to anticipate suit in that jurisdiction. Courts
must examine the facts in each case to determine if the require-
ments are met.
Signing a contract with another party is an affirmative act with
anticipated future consequences, but the courts are divided as to
whether a single contract alone is sufficient to satisfy jurisdic-
tional requirements. 49 In the years that followed McGee and Han-
son, several federal courts of appeals decided cases where the
defendant's only contact with the forum was a single contract. In
some of the cases jurisdiction was upheld, 0 but in others juris-
diction was denied."1 The decisions in several of the cases where
jurisdiction was upheld seemed to indicate a belief that McGee
permits the assertion of jurisdiction whenever a nonresident enters
into an agreement with a resident.52 The circuit courts have ar-
rived at inconsistent results in other cases not because they have
used different jurisdictional tests or considered different factors,
but because they have given different jurisdictional value to the
facts common to all single contract cases. For example, compare
the results reached and the analysis in Southwest Offset, Inc. v.
48. Id. at 297.
49. See Brewer, supra note 10; Note, supra note 10.
50. E.g., Gold Kist, Inc. v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 623 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1980); Pedi Bares,
Inc. v. P&C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495
F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974); Ajax Realty Corp. v. J.F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 966 (1973); In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972); Electro-
Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Elecs. Corp., 417 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1969).
51. E.g., Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 911 (1980); Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir.
1979), cer. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980); Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079 (1st Cir.
1973).
52. E.g., In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dasen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972). It appears this
reliance on McGee is misplaced. In Hanson the Court stressed that the defendant in McGee had a substantial
connection with the forum and that it was the defendant who made the initial solicitation. McGee, as construed
in Hanson, does not authorize an assertion of jurisdiction based on the existence of a single contract alone,
but rather requires an examination of other factors which indicate purposeful activity. Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 251-52 (1958).
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Hudco Publishing Co., Inc." with those of Lakeside Bridge and
Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co., Inc. "
In Southwest Offset the plaintiff was a Texas printer who brought
suit against an Alabama publisher in Texas. The plaintiff solicit-
ed the defendant's business in Alabama, and the defendant subse-
quently placed several orders with the plaintiff in Texas. In
asserting jurisdiction, the court emphasized the defendant's role
in placing the subsequent orders, rather than the plaintiffs initial
solicitation, and the fact that Texas could be deemed the "place"
of the contract since all but the first order were accepted at the
plaintiffs Texas office, the printing apparently was to be done
there even though the contract did not specify, and the contract
provided for shipment to the defendant in Alabama F.O.B.
Dallas."5 In Lakeside, the plaintiff was a Wisconsin manufacturer
who brought suit against a West Virginia purchaser for breach
of contract under which Lakeside was to provide the West Vir-
ginia purchaser with materials to be used in a construction project
in Virginia. As in Southwest Offset, the plaintiff visited the defen-
dant's office in West Virginia to solicit the contract and the defen-
dant subsequently mailed a purchase order to the plaintiff in
Wisconsin. In determining that Wisconsin could not assert juris-
diction, the court in Lakeside examined the same factors that the
Southwest Offset court examined, but they assigned those factors
different weight. In Lakeside the court emphasized the plaintiffs
initial contact rather than the defendant's subsequent conduct and
stated that the formalities of contract execution are not determina-
tive and at best show unilateral activity on the part of the plain-
tiff, which cannot be imputed to the defendant to show purposeful
availment of the benefits and protections of the forum's laws.5"
Recognizing that the Court's current jurisdictional standards
offer little guidance to the business community, Justice White has
frequently urged the Supreme Court to address the important ques-
tion of jurisdiction in the single contract case." The Court took
the opportunity to clarify its position by reviewing Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz.5"
53. 622 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1980).
54. 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980).
55. Southwest Offset, Inc., 622 F.2d 150, 152.
56. Lakeside, 597 F.2d 598, 603-04.
57. Chelsea House Publishers v. Nicholstone Book Bindery, Inc., 455 U.S. 994 (1982) (White, J., joined
by Burger, C.J., and Powell, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Baxter v. Mouzavires, 455 U.S. 1006
(1982) (White, J., joined by Powell, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co.
v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907, 909 (1980) (White, J., joined by Powell, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
58. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476, 478-79 (inference based on the holding and reasoning of the Burg-
er King Court).
19861
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
INSTANT CASE
The Court's Test
The Burger King Court emphasized that Hanson's requirement
of purposeful activity on the part of the defendant is as applica-
ble in contract cases as it is in any other context. The Supreme
Court clearly rejected the idea that a contract between a forum
resident and a nonresident can, standing alone, establish suffi-
cient minimum contacts for the proper assertion of jurisdiction.
The court faced with the issue must find other factors which, when
viewed along with the contract, indicate that the nonresident es-
tablished a purposeful connection with the forum state.
Under the Burger King test, the court seeking to assert juris-
diction must still establish that the assertion of jurisdiction over
the nonresident is reasonable and consistent with the due process
standard of fundamental fairness. The unfairness or unreasona-
bleness of asserting jurisdiction is minimized by the Court since
the added inconvenience or burden of defending in a distant fo-
rum is not very great today with our advanced means of trans-
portation and communication. It must be considered, however,
because while the lack of inconvenience to the defendant alone
cannot establish jurisdiction, unreasonableness can defeat juris-
diction.59 To defeat jurisdiction the unfairness to the defendant
would have to outweigh the considerations of purposeful avail-
ment and create a burden on the defendant which could not be
eliminated by some other means, such as a change of venue."0
The instance where unfairness will defeat jurisdiction even though
the nonresident has the requisite minimum contacts with the fo-
rum will be rare, if ever, because where a nonresident has "availed
himself of the privilege of conducting business [within the forum]
and . ..his activities are shielded by 'the benefits and protec-
tions' of the forum's laws it is presumptively not unreasonable to
require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum.
"61
After evaluating the negotiations leading up to the formation
of the contract, the terms incorporated into the contract, and the
anticipated consequences of signing the contract, the Court held
that Rudzewicz voluntarily established a substantial and continu-
ing relationship with Burger King's Miami headquarters by seek-
59. Id. at 476-78. See Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment
on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REv. 407, 421 (1980).
60. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477.
61. Id. at 476.
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ing to affiliate with a national organization rather than operating
an independent local restaurant and by signing a twenty-year fran-
chise agreement with the corporation. The agreement signed by
the parties called for regulation of Rudzewicz' business by the
Miami headquarters and remittance of rent payments to that
office. 2 Additionally, the documents contained provisions which
state that the agreements would be governed by Florida law. 3
The Court upheld the assertion of jurisdiction by the Florida
court by finding that Rudzewicz was an "experienced and
sophisticated" businessman who voluntarily negotiated and signed
a long-term agreement with a Florida corporation and who
received adequate notice from the contract documents and the par-
ties' entire course of dealings that he might be subjected to suit
in Florida for breach of that contract. 5
ANALYSIS
The Burger King decision does not reduce the jurisdictional
question in single contract cases to a simple formula. It still re-
quires that the issue be determined by weighing the facts of the
case, but it reduces the potential for inconsistent analysis of the
issue in such cases by examining elements common to all con-
tract cases and determining which are to be evaluated in deciding
whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts
within the forum and whether the assertion of jurisdiction is other-
wise fair. Its analysis centered on the parties' prior negotiations
and actual course of dealings, the terms embodied in the contract
documents, and the contemplated future consequences of their
agreement.
Courts in the past have inconsistently dealt with the physical
connection, or lack thereof, of the defendant with the forum. While
all courts seem to acknowledge that physical presence within the
forum has not been required to establish jurisdiction since McGee,'
some have stressed heavily the physical location of the negotia-
tions between the parties and forum visits by the defendant and
have minimized the importance of contact by telephone or through
62. Id. at 479-80.
63. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
64. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 484 (quoting the district court).
65. Id. at 487. The dissenting justices did not disagree with the majority's test to be applied or with the
factors which should be analyzed in determining whether the assertion of jurisdiction is proper. They arrived
at an opposite conclusion because they disagreed with the majority's interpretation of several important facts,
such as where and with whom the negotiations took place, who would supervise and lend support to the fran-
chisees in the future, what constituted performance and whether that performance was required in Florida,
and the relative bargaining positions of the parties. Id  at 487-88 (Stevens, J., joined by White, J., dissenting).
66. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
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the mails. Others have exactly reversed the emphasis, ignoring
the physical location of the negotiations and concentrating on the
forum ties established during negotiations. 7 The Burger King de-
cision indicates that the latter approach is the better approach.
The Court realized that the complexion of business has changed
and the use of the telephone and the mails for the transacting of
business is increasingly common, thus obviating the need for phys-
ical presence within a state in order to establish a business rela-
tionship there."
The Court's analysis of the facts in Burger King shows that the
question to be answered by courts in deciding the jurisdictional
issue in single contract cases is not whether the defendant has any
physical ties with the forum, because in most such cases there
will be minimal physical contacts with the forum state, but rather
whether the negotiations were so connected to the forum that the
defendant should have foreseen the possibility of litigation there. 9
The course of dealings among the parties here reinforced that
the decision-making authority was vested in the Miami office. All
of the agreements came out of Florida and were signed by Burg-
er King executives in Florida.7"
Another factor common to all contract cases to which the low-
er courts have assigned inconsistent jurisdictional value is the in-
itial contact between the parties. Some courts have viewed the
initial solicitation of the forum resident by the defendant as criti-
cal to a finding that the defendant has acted purposefully toward
the forum,71 but others have ignored the fact that the defendant
did not make the initial contact and have instead given more weight
to the subsequent conduct of the parties.72 The analysis used by
the Burger King Court is in accord with the latter approach.73
67. Compare Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Marshall County Hosp., 586 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1978) with Southwest
Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Co., 622 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1980); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau,
495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
68. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476.
69. Id. at 478-80 (inference based on reasoning and holding of the Court).
70. Id. at 480-81. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. v. Delta Intl Corp., 696 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1982); Lakeside
Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907
(1980); Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079 (1st Cir. 1973); O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hamp-
ton, 437 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1971).
72. See, e.g., Southwest Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Co., 622 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1980); Pedi Bares,
Inc. v. P&C Food Markets, Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495
F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974); Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968).
73. The Court did not take advantage of an opportunity to directly address the issue of the initial contact,
a factor which is frequently interpreted to be a key point in jurisdictional analysis but one which is given vary-
ing weight by the different lower courts. While the Court apparently did not consider that factor material to
its decision, its not specifically addressing the weight the initial contact was accorded in its analysis could leave
lower courts to decide that jurisdiction is improper unless the defendant has made the initial contact.
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While the defendant in Burger King made the initial contact
with the forum resident by filing a franchise application,"' the Court
focused its analysis on the role of the defendant in the negotia-
tions and why, because of his role in these negotiations, Rudzewicz
should have expected to be sued for breach of contract in Flori-
da. To the extent that a defendant negotiates contract terms and
the contract is not obtained through "fraud, undue influence, or
overweening bargaining power,"75 any unfairness which might
otherwise be associated with the exercise of long-arm jurisdic-
tion over the defendant disappears.
The Court viewed Rudzewicz and MacShara as experienced
businessmen who saw the profit potential of associating with a
national restaurant chain and who deliberately reached out be-
yond their own state and negotiated with a Florida corporation
in order to obtain economic benefits from a long-term franchise
agreement. 7
It is well established that the parties to an agreement can ex-
pressly consent to jurisdiction and expect the courts to enforce
that agreement even without other deliberate contacts with the fo-
rum.77 This rule has been consistently applied by the lower courts.
But a choice-of-law provision is an example of a contract term
which has been assigned varying degrees of jurisdictional sig-
nificance by the lower courts.7"
The decision in Burger King makes it clear that a choice-of-
law provision in a contract is a significant factor in support of
asserting long-arm jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. 9 The
Court determined that this kind of provision standing alone would
not be sufficient to confer jurisdiction but, when combined with
other acts that normally take place in a business transaction such
as direct communications by mail or telephone, it reinforced the
74. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 466.
75. Id. at 486 (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972)).
76. Id. at 479-80. The majority rejected the argument advanced by the dissent and the circuit court that
the parties were not in equal bargaining positions by attaching significance to the fact that Rudzewicz was a
senior partner in a Detroit accounting firm who was represented by counsel throughout the negotiations and
to the fact that Rudzewicz did in fact succeed in negotiating a reduction in the rent. Id. at 484-85.
77. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szuk-
hem, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
78. Compare Hydrokinetics, Inc. v. Alaska Mechanical, Inc., 700 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 962, rehg denied, 467 U.S. 1257 (1984); Marathon Metallic Bldg. Co. v. Mountain Empire Constr.
Co., 653 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1981); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974);
O'Hare Intl Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1971) with Southwest Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publishing
Co., 622 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1980); Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d
596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980); Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Marshall County Hosp., 586
F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1978).
79. The agreement signed by Rudzewicz and MacShara contained such a choice-of-law provision stating
that Florida law would govern any litigation on the contract. See supra text accompanying note 19.
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defendant's deliberate affiliation with the state and the foreseea-
bility of litigation there.8"
The majority of the circuit court of appeals, with whom Justice
Stevens, dissenting in Burger King, agreed, was critical of reli-
ance on standard "boilerplate language" in determining that juris-
diction exists because it may mean that nonresident consumers
will be subjected to the jurisdiction of foreign courts simply be-
cause they have purchased goods under contracts containing such
language." However, using the analysis of the Burger King Court,
the problems with consumer contracts envisioned by the circuit
court will not materialize. First, the Court emphasized that a
choice-of-law provision is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction
without the presence of other factors showing that the defendant
intended to associate himself with the forum. Second, the Court,
before upholding consent clauses, has always determined that the
parties were in equal bargaining positions and that the agreement
signed was not a contract of adhesion. 2
The Court in its analysis recognized that a contract is merely
the embodiment of the parties' agreement and that the consequences
of the agreement are "the real object of the business transaction." 3
The contemplated consequences and obligations stemming from
a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant are among the
factors often considered by courts in jurisdictional analysis, but
not without difficulty and confusion. Some courts have imputed
performance by the plaintiff within the forum to the defendant
in determining the defendant's contacts, but others have held that
the plaintiffs activities are not enough to tie the defendant to a
forum."4 In Burger King, the Court emphasized that it is the obli-
gations required of the defendant under the contract which are
important in the jurisdictional analysis and that there must be some
conduct on the part of the defendant to show that he intended to
establish a relationship with a forum resident and that, because
80. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 482.
81. Id. at 487-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1510 (11th
Cir. 1984).
82. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szuk-
hent, 375 U.S. at 311, 315-16 (1964).
83. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 479 (quoting Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 317
(1943)).
84. Compare Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P&C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977); In-Flight Devices
Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Elecs. Corp.,
417 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1969) with Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597
F.2d 596 (7th Cit. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980); Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482
F.2d 1079 (1st Cir. 1973).
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of that conduct, he could reasonably foresee the possibility of liti-
gation within the forum.8"
The Burger King opinion makes it clear that a court consider-
ing the appropriateness of asserting jurisdiction cannot stop its
analysis with the determination that the defendant has purpose-
fully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum's
laws. It must still examine the fundamental fairness of asserting
jurisdiction under the circumstances." The Court's opinion in this
area gave the lower courts much guidance as to factors that should
be considered, the relative importance of those factors, and al-
ternate ways of solving problems which may be encountered. 7
While recognizing that these considerations can sometimes es-
tablish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing
of minimum contacts that would otherwise be required,8" the Court
emphasized the heavy burden that is on the nonresident defen-
dant who has deliberately affiliated himself with the forum state
and who wishes to challenge the assertion of jurisdiction on fair-
ness grounds. The Court held that for such a defendant to defeat
jurisdiction, "he must present a compelling case that the presence
of other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." 9
Most such considerations may be accommodated through means
short of finding jurisdiction unconstitutional.90
85. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 478-79. The contemplated consequences or obligations the Court found
to be relevant in Burger King were that Rudzewicz entered a 20-year agreement envisioning continuing con-
tacts with a forum resident, he was contractually required to send payments to the forum, and the agreement
contained a choice-of-law provision. Id. at 480. This enumeration of the factors which made Rudzewicz' amena-
bility to suit in Florida foreseeable should clarify for the lower courts the relevance of such factors in jurisdic-
tional analysis. While some courts have always considered choice-of-law provisions and provisions for payment
by the defendant within the forum state important, others have not, considering them immaterial or of secon-
dary value. See Hydrokinetics, Inc. v. Alaska Mechanical, Inc., 700 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 962, rehg denied, 467 U.S. 1257 (1984); Scullin Steel Co. v. National Ry. Utilization Corp., 676
F.2d 309 (8th Cir. 1982); Southwest Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Co., 622 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1980);
Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977); O'Hare Intl. Bank v. Hampton,
437 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1971).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
87. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476-78. The Court stated that lower courts should evaluate "the burden
on the defendant," "the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute," "the plaintiffs interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief," "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolu-
tion of controversies," and the "shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies." Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
88. Id.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. While noting that at some point the inconvenience to the nonresident defendant may become "so
substantial as to achieve constitutional magnitude" and thereby "defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even
if the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities," the Court mentioned several times in its decision
that substantial inconvenience to the defendant can be accommodated by a change in venue. Id. at 477, 478,
484 (emphasis in original).
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CONCLUSION
The decision in Burger King should eliminate some of the con-
fusion in applying the due process jurisdictional test in single con-
tract cases, but it has left questions in some areas. The Court
cleared up the misconception that McGee9 allowed the assertion
of jurisdiction based on a single-contact contract alone and made
it clear that Hanson92 required an examination of additional fac-
tors to determine if the nonresident had established a purposeful
connection with the forum state.
The Court emphasized that the nonresident must have fair no-
tice that he is amenable to suit within the forum and that amena-
bility must be determined from the nonresident's affirmative
conduct. Forum activities on the part of the plaintiff are irrele-
vant to the jurisdictional determination. Courts should look to the
overall negotiations and course of dealing between the parties and
to the agreement which came out of those negotiations to deter-
mine whether the defendant's connection with the forum was such
that he should have foreseen the possibility of litigation there. The
contract terms which tend to establish a deliberate relationship
with the forum are relevant to the jurisdictional analysis. This
decision makes it clear that a choice-of-law provision in the con-
tract is one such term, and it should be a significant factor in sup-
port of asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident even though it
should not be interpreted as express consent to jurisdiction and
cannot independently confer jurisdiction as a choice-of-forum pro-
vision can.
While the Court made clear the jurisdictional importance of the
negotiations between the parties which culminated in the agree-
ment and the contemplated consequences of that agreement, it left
less clear the significance, if any, which should be attached to
the defendant's breach of that agreement. Breach cannot be inter-
preted as an anticipated consequence of a contract, but the Burger
King Court found that Rudzewicz' refusal to make payments re-
quired under contract "caused foreseeable injuries to the corpo-
ration in Florida" and implied that this foreseeability of injury
should have given Rudzewicz reason to anticipate suit in Florida.93
This reasoning appears to be a revitalization of the effects test
91. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
92. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, reh'g denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958).
93. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 480.
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for jurisdiction94 which the Court rejected under the facts of Kulko s
but did not reject as a basis for jurisdiction in commercial litiga-
tion,9" but it seems to be inconsistent with the Court's language
that the foreseeability of causing injury in the forum is not a "suffi-
cient benchmark" for exercising personal jurisdiction. 7 The use
of this seemingly inconsistent language without explanation has
left confusion as to the importance of the in-forum effects of a
nonresident's conduct in jurisdictional analysis.
One jurisdictional question which remains undecided after Burg-
er King is the extent to which purchases made within the forum
can constitute contacts sufficient to justify the assertion of juris-
diction over a nonresident.9 The Court rejected the notion that
an ordinary consumer with no other contacts with the forum will
be subjected to jurisdiction in a distant forum simply because of
nominal purchases made there, but it did not expressly address
the issue of commercial purchases and the effect of those purchases
on determining whether the nonresident intended to establish a
purposeful relationship with forum residents."
Courts analyzing the appropriateness of asserting jurisdiction
have commonly made a distinction between nonresident buyers
and nonresident sellers, with jurisdiction being asserted more fre-
quently over sellers than buyers because sellers have traditional-
ly been viewed as the dominant parties in a transaction and are
considered more able to defend in a foreign jurisdiction. The Burg-
er King decision weakened the buyer/seller distinction, and it
seems unlikely that courts will be able to base jurisdiction on that
distinction alone. The courts must look behind the buyer/seller
relationship to the involvement of the parties in the transaction
and must consider all factors, including the role of the parties in
the negotiations, the relative bargaining power of the parties, the
amount of money involved, and whether it was an isolated trans-
action or a continuing relationship. After Burger King the cor-
94. Under this test, a court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident whenever the nonresident commits
an act or omission which has an effect within the forum if the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable.
This is true even if the effects are caused by actions taken outside the forum state. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICTS OF LAws 37 (1971).
95. Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 96, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 908 (1978).
96. Id. The Court stated that the test would apply when a nonresident sought a commercial benefit from
the solicitation of business from a forum resident. Id. at 97.
97. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 295 (1980)).
98. The Court in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), held that pur-
chases were not sufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction where the cause of action is not related to
the defendant's activities within the forum but it did not address the issue in terms of a related cause of action.
99. The Court did not consider that the franchisees in this case had purchased equipment for $165,000 from
a Burger King subsidiary in Florida. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 466-67.
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rect distinction for the courts to make is not between buyers and
sellers but between active and passive involvement in the trans-
action.
The fact that franchising is becoming increasingly common, as
more and more entrepreneurs seek the easy entry into the mar-
ketplace that franchising offers and the benefits that flow from
affiliation with a national organization, seems to be an underly-
ing factor in the Court's decision in this case. Its ruling indicates
that the Court is not willing to give the burden on the defendant
more weight in franchise cases than it does in other cases. Fair-
ness dictates that a defendant who derives profits from deliberate
contacts with the forum should be responsible for the costs such
activities incur. Entering a long-term franchise agreement with
a forum resident is a deliberate action and, therefore, the bur-
dens of litigation are knowingly incurred, even though a small
business operating at a single location in its home state may not
have the resources necessary to defend an action in a distant state.
Miriam Lee
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